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International courts have at times interpreted the customary rules on interpreta-
tion. This is interesting because what is being interpreted is: i) rules of interpretation, 
which sounds dangerously tautological, and ii) customary law, the interpretation of 
which has not been the object of critical analysis. The present paper, aims to fill this 
lacuna and prove that not only interpretation of customary rules of interpretation is 
not problematic (it is neither tautological nor impossible), but also that it is a process 
completely distinguishable from that of formation/identification of customary inter-
national law. Whereas the latter determines the existence of a customary rule and has 
to grapple with ‘practice’ and ‘opinio juris’, interpretation of customary rules concerns 
itself with the rules after they have come into existence. I will then demonstrate that 
customary rules of interpretation have consistently been interpreted in international 
jurisprudence and that the interpretative process bears certain similarities to treaty 
interpretation.
Keywords
interpretation – interpretation of treaties – interpretation of customary international 
law – customary international law – induction – deduction – assertion – Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties
1 Introduction
Lord McNair, famously stated that the ‘there is no part of the law of treaties 
which the text-writer approaches with more trepidation than the question 
of interpretation’.1 However, it seems that for a long time now, and especially 
1   Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 364.
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post-VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), international courts 
and tribunals have taken in their stride such interpretative operations without 
batting an eye. What is striking is that the rules that are being interpreted are 
the rules of interpretation themselves, and in fact not just the VCLT rules on 
interpretation, but also their customary law counterparts.2 This is surprising 
for two main reasons:
1) what is being interpreted is rules of interpretation, which runs the danger 
of sounding and being tautological in nature, and
2) what is being interpreted is customary law, which in and of itself is 
quite surprising as literature seems to focus entirely on interpretation of 
treaties.3
The present paper aims to fill this lacuna and prove that not only interpre-
tation of customary rules of interpretation is not problematic (it is neither 
tautological nor impossible), but also that it is a process that should be com-
pletely distinguished from that of formation/identification of customary in-
ternational law.4 Whereas the latter determines the existence of a customary 
rule and therefore by necessity it has to grapple with ‘practice’ and ‘opinio juris’, 
interpretation of customary rules5 concerns itself with the rules after they have 
been formed/identified. Consequently, interpretation of customary rules is not 
bound by the straightjacket of ‘practice’ and ‘opinio juris’, and those customary 
rules can be allowed to breathe freely and evolve in the same way that treaty 
rules do. Having done that, I will then demonstrate that customary rules of in-
terpretation have consistently been interpreted in international jurisprudence 
and the interpretative process is based mutatis mutandis on the same rules 
that are used for interpretation of treaty rules.
Based on the above considerations, this article will address the following 
issues in the Sections to follow. Section 2 will demonstrate the timeliness of the 
present inquiry in the context of a surge in interest and research with respect 
to both CIL as a source of international law and the process of interpretation 
2   On the customary nature of the rules of interpretation, see indicatively: Arbitral Award of 31 
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1991, para. 48; Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1995, para. 33 (hereinafter Qatar v. Bahrain case); Oil Platforms (Preliminary Objections) 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 23.
3   For an extensive list of authorship on the matter see infra note 15.
4   See also: Jean d’Aspremont, “The Idea of ‘Rules’ in the Sources of International Law”, 84 BYIL 
(2014), pp. 103–130.
5   Any customary rule, including the customary rules of interpretation as will be shown in the 
Sections to follow.
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in general. In this milieu it is interesting to engage in a discussion as to whether 
CIL rules can be interpreted in a fashion similar to the rules contained in trea-
ties. In Section 3, some basic concepts surrounding the discussion of interpre-
tation of CIL rules will be analysed. Firstly, it will be shown that despite the 
rejection of the interpretability of CIL rules, legal theory and practice seem to 
indicate the exact opposite.6 Second, induction and deduction will be shown 
to be methodologically apposite to different stages in the ‘life-cycle’ of any 
CIL rule.7 Whereas induction is critical to the formation and identification of 
a ‘proto-stage’ of CIL, deduction is more apposite to the interpretation of a 
CIL rule. This means that once a CIL rule has come into existence, the further 
clarification of its content, in most instances, will not be amenable to the in-
ductive process of resorting to State practice and opinio juris, but rather will be 
achieved through an interpretative process stricto sensu.8 Within this discus-
sion, it will also be demonstrated that the expression ‘interpretation of State 
practice’ is a misnomer. It is not interpretation in the strict sense, but rather 
evaluation of the importance of State practice in the process of the formation 
a CIL rule. Consequently, it is substantively and substantially different from 
the process of interpretation of CIL rules, with which the present Article deals. 
Section 4 will examine the treaty and jurisprudential evidence that prove the 
interpretability of CIL. Finally, Section 5 will demonstrate that the interpret-
ability of CIL rules is not only possible and has occurred, but it is so ubiqui-
tous that it has manifested even in cases when the object of interpretation is 
not any random CIL rule, but the CIL rules of interpretation themselves. In 
order to prove that CIL rules can be interpreted it would have been sufficient to 
demonstrate even one CIL rule having been interpreted. However, if even the 
CIL rules of interpretation can be interpreted, this is proof that the process of 
interpretation is part and parcel of the existence and functioning of even the 
unwritten rules of CIL and without it the application of CIL rules would run 
into insurmountable logical paradoxes.
6   This point, central to the entirety of this Article, will be further elaborated in Sections 3, 4 
and 5.
7   Assertion being ‘methodological-less’ will feature only to the extent necessary to show that it 
should be considered as a proper method of determining either the formation or interpreta-
tion of a CIL rule.
8   Which is familiar to everyone in the context of treaty interpretation.
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2 Resurgence of Interest in Interpretation and Customary 
International Law
In international law interpretation is ubiquitous and is the process through 
which the interpreter attempts to determine the meaning of the rule that is 
being interpreted. Its importance is evident by the mere fact that every case 
brought before international courts and tribunals has dealt one way or another 
with questions of interpretation.
Customary international law (CIL), in turn, is one of the formal sources 
of international law and together with treaties are the most important ones, 
creating binding rules of international law. Some of the most crucial rules of 
international law started and continue to exist as CIL.9 Examples of CIL rules 
are: the prohibition of genocide and torture, the prohibition of slavery and 
piracy, the rules on State responsibility, the principle of non-refoulement and 
the no-harm rule, to name but a few. It is undeniable that all of these CIL rules 
have made and continue to make a vital contribution to international law and 
society. CIL’s importance is further underlined by the fact that its rules also 
cover areas that have not been regulated by treaties, that general CIL is binding 
on all States,10 and that several systemic rules are customary in nature, such as 
the rules governing the resolution of normative conflict.11 The issue with CIL, 
however, is that it is an unwritten source of international law. Its existence is 
determined inductively through an examination of two elements, state prac-
tice and opinio juris.12
There has never before been a time when international law affected and 
regulated so many areas of human activity as it does today. The proliferation of 
international rules and of international courts and tribunals makes the need 
for clarification of how the sources of international law are being interpreted 
and applied ever so imperative. In such an expanding international legal land-
scape, where CIL remains one of the main sources of international law, it is 
inconceivable to be still stumbling in the dark as to how CIL rules are being 
interpreted. If such a situation is left unchecked, this will have deleterious 
effects for the international legal system both at a micro- (parties to a dispute) 
9    Certain of these have also been codified in treaties.
10   Whereas a treaty is binding only on its parties.
11   Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law (2003).
12   North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark and the Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1969, para. 44.
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and a macro-level (all ‘users’/‘participants’ of international law).13 They would 
lose faith in the legal certainty of the international legal system and as a result 
would have increasingly less incentive to make use of the dispute settlement 
procedures due to their unpredictability. In that manner the lack of foresee-
ability would undermine the effectiveness and stability of the international 
legal system as a whole. CIL’s role in the functioning of the international legal 
system is too critical to be left to chance or even worse to ‘judicial assertions’. 
This need becomes even more imperative, when considering that the rules of 
interpretation may themselves be the subject of change.14 Therefore they need 
to be an object of meticulous study.
Of course there has been no shortage throughout the ages of writings on 
both interpretation15 and CIL.16 However, at this particular juncture there 
13   For the meaning of these terms see: Emmanuel Roucounas, “Facteurs privés et droit 
international public”, 299 RdC (2003), pp. 9 et seq.; Emmanuel Roucounas, “The Users 
of International Law”, in M.H. Arsanjani et al. (eds.), Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (2011), pp. 217–234; Rosalyn Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use it (1994), pp. 39–55; Rosalyn 
Higgins, Themes and Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings in International Law 
(2009), pp. 74–90.
14   Donald Greig, Intertemporality and the Law of Treaties (2001), pp. 113–114; Hazel Fox, 
“Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention and the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case”, 
in M. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias and P. Merkouris (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (2010), pp. 64–65; Ulf Linderfalk, “The 
Application of International Legal Norms Over Time: the Second Branch of Intertemporal 
Law”, 58/2 NILR (2011), pp. 163–165; Malcolm Shaw, “Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu 
Island (Botswana/Namibia)”, 49 ICLQ (2000), p. 968; Panos Merkouris, “(Inter)temporal 
Considerations in the Interpretative Process of the VCLT: Do Treaties Endure, Perdure 
or Exdure?”, 45 NYIL (2014), pp. 147–150; Jan Erik Helgesen, “What are the Limits to the 
Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights?”, 31 HRLJ (2011), 
p. 275.
15   Hugo Grotius, (Clement Barksdale transl. and annot.), De jure belli ac pacis (The Illustrious 
Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annotations. III Parts and Memorials 
of the Author’s Life and Death) (1654), Book II, Chapter XVI; Emmerich de Vattel, The 
Law of Nations or Principles on the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns (1793), Book II, Chapter XVII; Samuel Pufendorf ([s.n.] transl.), Of 
the Law of Nature and Nations (1703), Book V, Chapter XII; Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The Law 
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–54: Treaty Interpretation and 
Other Points”, 33 BYIL (1957), p. 203; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International 
Law by the International Court (1958); Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd ed., 
2015), p. 251; Robert Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international: esquisses 
d’ une herméneutique juridique moderne pour le droit international public (2006); Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (2005), 
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seems to have been a spike in interest and research with respect to both these 
areas. On the one hand, international law seems to be going through a simi-
lar process as mathematics in the 19th century. It has become obvious that 
in order for international law to progress as a science, we need to identify the 
axioms on which the system is based, as well as the rules under which the 
‘building blocks’ of the international legal system function. Although the study 
of the sources of international law has, similarly to interpretation, never been 
entirely out of fashion, in the late 20th and early 21st century there has been a 
resurgence in the efforts to clarify CIL. The International Law Association, for 
Chapter 3. There are also always new issues emerging. See for instance: Georg Nolte 
(ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (2013); Panos Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and 
the Principle of Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave (2015); Vassilis 
Tzevelekos, “The Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: an 
Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human 
Rights Teleology?”, 31/3 Michigan Journal of International Law (2010), pp. 621–690; Jean 
d’Aspremont, “The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-determination 
and Law-ascertainment Distinguished”, in A. Bianchi, D. Peat and M. Windsor (eds.), 
Interpretation in International Law (2015), pp. 111–129.
16   Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, 47 BYIL (1977), pp. 1–53; 
Peter Haggenmacher, “La doctrine des deux éléments du droit coutumier dans la pra-
tique de la Cour internationale”, 90 RGDIP (1986), pp. 5–125; Alain Pellet, “Article 38”, 
in A. Zimmermann, Chr. Tomuschat and K. Oellers-Frahm (eds.), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd ed., 2012), pp. 731–870; Hugh Thirlway, 
International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination of the Continuing Role of 
Custom in the Present Period of Codification of International Law (1972), pp. 46–60; Photini 
Pazartzis, “Le rôle de la pratique dans le droit coutumier”, in R. Huesa Vinaixa (ed.), L’ influ-
ence des sources sur l’ unité et la fragmentation du droit international (2006), pp. 81–102; 
Serge Sur, La coutume internationale (1990); Charles de Visscher, “La codification du droit 
international”, 6/I RdC (1925), pp. 349–66; Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of 
International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment of Legal Rules (2011); Michael P. Scharf, 
Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian 
Moments (2013); Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Limits of International Law (2007), 
pp. 3–78; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “A Theory of Customary International 
Law”, 66/4 University of Chicago Law Review (1999), pp. 1113–1177; Joel P. Trachtman, “The 
Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law”, in C.A. Bradley (ed.), Custom’s 
Future: International Law in a Changing World (2016), pp. 172–204; Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, 
“Juris Dicere: Custom as a Matrix, Custom as a Norm, and the Role of Judges and (their) 
Ideology in Custom Making”, in N.M. Rajkovic, T. Aalberts and Th. Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(eds.), Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and their Politics (2016 forthcom-
ing – on file with the author); Jean d’Aspremont, “The Decay of Modern Customary 
International Law in Spite of Scholarly Heroism”, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756904 (last accessed on 20 January 2016).
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instance, had a 17-year (1984–2000) project on the formation of general cus-
tomary international law.17 More recently, the International Law Commission 
(ILC), with Sir Michael Wood acting as Special Rapporteur, has taken up the 
challenge of illuminating this mercurial process by initiating a study on the 
identification of CIL, that started in 2013 and is expected to complete its work 
in 2017.18
On the other hand, there is also a great focus at the international level for 
clarification of the rules of interpretation with the ILC19 and its respective 
Special Rapporteurs in the last few years having devoted several of its topics 
under consideration to interpretative issues. Indicatively, I mention the ILC’s 
work on:
• Fragmentation/Diversification of International Law, with Martti Koskenniemi 
as Special Rapporteur;20
• and the still ongoing Treaties over Time/Subsequent Agreements and Practice 
in Treaty Interpretation, with Georg Nolte as Special Rapporteur.21
17   ILA, “Final Report of the Committee – Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law”, in ILA, Report of the 69th Conference 
(2000), pp. 712–778.
18   Michael Wood, “First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International 
Law”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/663 (17 May 2013); Michael Wood, “Second Report on Identification 
of Customary International Law”, UN Doc A/CN.4/672 (22 May 2014); Michael Wood, 
“Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682 
(27 March 2015).
19   The mandate of which is two-pronged: codification of international law and progressive 
development.
20   Study Group of the International Law Commission, “Report on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law – Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 
2006) (hereinafter ILC Study Group on Fragmentation).
21   Georg Nolte, “First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in 
Relation to Treaty Interpretation”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/660 (19 March 2013); Georg Nolte, 
“Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
Treaty Interpretation”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/671 (26 March 2014); Georg Nolte, “Third Report 
on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation”, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/683 (7 April 2015).
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In addition to these, the ILA established as recently as May 2015, a Study Group 
on The Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation,22 the aim of which 
will be to examine the problematic areas of the rules of interpretation their 
evolution through time and the difference in content on the basis of the docu-
ment being interpreted.
However, a combination of both interpretation and CIL has so far never 
been fully researched.23 Nevertheless, it is the author’s belief that within the 
context described, the time is now ripe for such an inquiry in order to further 
clarify the function of CIL by understanding the process of its interpretation, 
and as a result improve the reasoning and quality of international judgments 
and increase the predictability/foreseeability of the international legal system. 
What we need to find an answer to is, first of all, whether CIL can be inter-
preted in a manner similar to treaty rules and second, what is the content of 
the rules that govern this process of interpretation of CIL. Of course, an ex-
haustive analysis of these questions falls beyond the scope of this article. For 
this reason the analysis will focus mainly on the following issues. In Section 3, 
key concepts will be defined, i.e. deduction, induction and assertion as well as 
the difference between interpretation of CIL stricto sensu and interpretation of 
State practice as evidence of the existence of a rule of CIL. In Section 4, treaty 
and case-law evidence will be provided that demonstrates the interpretability 
of CIL. Finally, in Section 5 the analytical focus will turn on the interpreta-
tion of the CIL rules of interpretation of themselves. Cases will be presented 
where the relevant judicial bodies embarked on an interpretation of CIL rules 
on interpretation.
3 Defining the Contours of the Notion of Interpretation of CIL
Before demonstrating that the customary rules of interpretation can be the 
object of interpretation, certain issues and misconceptions need to be clarified.
22   ILA, “Study Groups”, available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/
cid/1057 (last accessed on 20 January 2016).
23   Although this topic also seems to be rising in importance, as will be demonstrated in the 
following Sections. Furthermore, one of the topics that the mandate of the aforemen-
tioned 2015 ILA Study Group describes as being within its ambit of research, is that of 
interpretation of CIL.
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3.1 Induction vs. Deduction
As mentioned above, CIL is one of the formal sources of international law. As 
stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases24 and consistently affirmed in 
international jurisprudence, its existence is determined through examination 
of two elements, State practice and opinio juris. This process, from specific 
instances arriving at an identification of a more general rule, is an inductive 
process.
However, since all rules, written or unwritten, despite having a “core of set-
tled meaning” also have “a penumbra of uncertainty”,25 this means that the 
inductive process of recourse to State practice and opinio juris will always be 
wanting. It will not in all instances be able to provide an answer as to whether 
a particular situation can be deemed as falling within the scope of meaning 
of a CIL rule. With respect to the other formal source of international law, 
treaties, this problem is resolved through the deductive process of interpreta-
tion, which bridges the gap between the existence of a treaty and its appli-
cation. However, with CIL, if one rejects the possibility that CIL is subject to 
24   North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, 44.













Figure 1 Formation of CIL.
 135
International Community Law Review 19 (2�17) 126–155
Interpreting The Customary Rules On Interpretation
interpretation,26 in a fashion similar to treaties, then we reach an absurdum. 
In such a scenario, CIL would have to be identified each and every time it is 
applied. The international judge would have to find each and every time suf-
ficient State practice and opinio juris on each and every single topic that the 
CIL rule might relate to. Clearly this goes against any notion of rules, be they 
treaty or customary in nature, changing and evolving through time, and having 
a certain degree of content-flexibility in order to adapt in a changing legal and 
societal landscape. In addition to this, if CIL cannot be interpreted, then this 
would require of every CIL rule (an unwritten rule) such a degree of specificity 
that not even treaties (written texts) are expected to have. Such a discrepancy 
inescapably leads to absurd conclusions, and consequently the negation of the 
interpretation of CIL is a false premise.
In order to tackle the above concerns, various authors have argued in favour 
of a “deductive approach” for the identification of CIL,27 i.e. using methods 
other than reference to State practice and opinio juris in order to determine the 
formation of a rule of CIL. It is at this point that an important distinction needs 
to be made. The proponents of the “flexible deductive approach” argue in fa-
vour of the existence of such an approach as either a methodological tool or as 
an alternative/emerging method of identification of CIL, that is in clear con-
trast with the classical inductive method of looking at State practice and opinio 
juris. Interpretation of CIL, on the other hand, is fundamentally different. 
26   See, for instance, the following statements: “it is neither usual nor advisable to use the 
notion of interpretation in connection with the clarification of norms of customary law”; 
Rudolf Bernhardt, “Interpretation in International Law”, in: Rudolf Bernhardt and Rudolf 
L. Bindschedler (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II (1992), p. 1417; “the 
irrelevance of linguistic expression excludes interpretation as a necessary operation in 
order to apply [customary rules]”; Tullio Treves, “Customary International Law”, MPEPIL 
1393 (November 2006), para. 2, available at: http://www.mpepil.com (last accessed on 20 
January 2016); “content merges with existence [and, thus, CIL cannot be interpreted]”; 
Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International Law (1984), p. 109. Similarly Degan holds 
that interpretation is restricted only to written treaties, therefore it cannot apply to verbal 
treaties, let alone CIL; Vladimir D. Degan, L’ interprétation des accords en droit interna-
tional (1963), p. 162.
27   Stefan Talmon, “Determining Customary International Law: the ICJ’s Methodology 
between Induction, Deduction and Assertion”, 26/2 EJIL (2015), p. 417; Anthea Roberts, 
“Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation”, 
95 AJIL (2001), p. 758; Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez, “Methods for the Identification of 
Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s New Millennium 
Jurisprudence”, 60 ICLQ (2011), pp. 686–689.
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Although it is a deductive process, it is neither a methodological tool, nor is it a 
method to determine the formation of CIL. Interpretation deals with identify-
ing the content of a CIL rule, after it has come into existence. Interpretation of 
CIL is an inescapable result of the continued existence of a CIL rule through 
time. The fact that international judges sometimes apply the inductive process 
and others the deductive process of interpretation should not be erroneously 
considered as a matter of methodological choice. On the contrary, it an ines-
capable and direct result of the judges dealing with two different ‘object-stages’ 
in the ‘life-cycle’ of CIL. Rules of CIL do not have a momentary life-span. They 
continue to manifest themselves and produce legal effects through prolonged 
periods of time. This is exactly where the difference lies between the inductive 
and deductive approach to CIL. The inductive approach focuses on the forma-
tion of CIL, the emphasis is on how CIL comes into existence. However, once a 
CIL has been identified as having been formed, its continued manifestation 
and application in a particular case will be dependent on the deductive pro-
cess of interpretation. In this manner, interpretation focuses on how the rule 
is to be understood and applied after the rule has come into existence and for its 































































Figure 2 Proper place of interpretation in the life-cycle of CIL.
 137
International Community Law Review 19 (2�17) 126–155
Interpreting The Customary Rules On Interpretation
It is these two different stages in the ‘life-cycle’ of CIL that are the raison d’être 
of the co-existence of the inductive and deductive approach to CIL, and which 
demonstrate the necessity for examining the rules that govern the process of 
interpretation of CIL.
3.2 The Theoretical Dead-End of Assertion
Whereas in the application of treaties the process of interpretation is one that 
must always yield a single solution,28 with respect to CIL the rules of interpre-
tation of customary rules have not been examined. This leads to one of the 
following two paradoxical scenarios, if we do not accept the interpretability 
of CIL. Either CIL needs to be induced each and every time, by reference to 
state practice and opinio juris (but this is extremely problematic as it fails to 
take into account the continued existence, development and manifestation of 
CIL rules)29 or CIL is to be asserted by international judges.30 Acknowledging 
assertion as a valid methodological tool for the identification of CIL would be 
tantamount to recognizing that international judges create law: they become 
law-makers and exercise a power to legislate (pouvoir de légiférer). However 
such a concession would go against any notion of separation of powers. An 
alternative understanding of ‘assertion’ is offered by Wood and Sender, who 
argue that “[u]nlike induction and deduction, assertion is self-evidently not a 
methodology for determining the existence of a rule of customary international 
law. It is essentially a way of drafting a judgment, a way of stating a conclusion”.31 
Irrespective of whether one views assertion as a slippery slope leading to an 
exercise of pouvoir de légiférer or a manner of drafting a judgment, what is 
28   According to Sir Humphrey Waldock, “[c]learly, on the plane of interpretation, the treaty 
has only one correct interpretation” (emphasis added); Humphrey Waldock, “Sixth Report 
on the Law of Treaties”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/186 and Add.1, 2/Rev.1, 3–7 (11 March – 14 June 
1966), Draft Article 68 – Observations and Proposals of the Special Rapporteur, para. 9, 
reproduced in YILC Vol. II [1966], p. 90.
29   On the importance of ontological theories in international law in order to explain issues 
of identity, evolution, continuity and change, see Merkouris, supra note 14, pp. 125–128.
30   This option of assertion is identified by Talmon as methodological tool of identification of 
CIL (see Talmon supra note 27); however, although this is what in some cases judges may 
do, it is far removed from what they should do. This is nothing more than an example of 
the perennial conflict between Sein and Sollen.
31   Michael Wood and Omri Sender, “The International Court of Justice and Customary 
International Law: A Reply to Stefan Talmon”, available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
the-international-court-of-justice-and-customary-international-law-a-reply-to-stefan-
talmon/ (last accessed on 20 January 2016) (emphasis added).
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common is that assertion is not a valid methodological tool for the determina-
tion of either the existence of the content of a CIL rule.
Both of the above described scenarios are untenable, so evidently in the 
study of CIL there is a critical gap in understanding how CIL can be applied in 
individual cases once it has been formed. This gap can only be filled through 
the process of interpretation of CIL.
3.3 ‘Interpretation’ of State Practice vs. Interpretation of CIL
This brings me to my next point. Oftentimes in the study of CIL the term 
‘interpretation’ is used rather loosely. This may lead to the erroneous con-
clusion that interpretation of CIL is nothing new, and is already extensively 
discussed. This could not be further from the truth. The reason for this mis-
conception is that the word ‘interpretation’ is often used to describe the evalu-
ation of State practice,32 or even more confusingly is used interchangeably to 
denote both ‘interpretation of CIL’ and ‘interpretation of State practice leading 
to the formation of CIL’.33 However, the linguistic misuse of the same term 
should not lead us to the erroneous conclusion that it is one and the same 
process.34 In the case at hand, it is the use of term ‘interpretation’ to describe 
two completely distinct processes that creates the fallacious impression that 
interpretation is ubiquitous in the formation of CIL, and therefore there is no 
need for attempting to identify the rules that govern the process. The critical 
flaw in this construction is that ‘interpretation of State practice’ is not inter-
pretation in the strict legal sense (interpretatio stricto sensu). ‘Interpretation’ 
is used in similar fashion as ‘evaluation’. What judges do is not interpret State 
practice, they evaluate it, they examine its gravity for the purpose of determin-
ing the existence or not of CIL. On the contrary, ‘interpretation of CIL’ requires 
an already existing CIL rule. Furthermore, not unlike interpretation of treaties, 
it is a process that follows certain rules and principles (for treaties it is Articles 
31–33 VCLT and their CIL counterparts). Consequently, it is a process clearly 
distinct from the erroneously called ‘interpretation of State practice’, which 
should be properly called ‘evaluation of State practice’ to avoid confusion. It is 
32   Charles de Visscher, Problémes d’ interprétation judiciaire en droit international public 
(1963), pp. 219 et seq.
33   Frederick Schauer, “Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law”, in A. Perreau-
Saussine and J.B. Murphy (eds.), The Nature of Customary Law (2007), pp. 13–34.
34   Serge Sur, L’ interprétation en droit international public (1974), pp. 189–190; Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (2008), 
p. 496.
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with respect to the ‘interpretation of CIL’ that research needs to be conducted 
in order to determine the rules that govern this strictly legal process.35
4 Interpreting Customary International Law
4.1 Treaty Evidence
Having established the basic precepts of interpretation of CIL, we can now 
move on to what is the main focus of the present Article, i.e. to prove the possi-
bility of interpretation of the customary rules of interpretation. In this context 
it is useful to mention, albeit briefly, some of the most important indicia in 
international treaties and cases that demonstrate the interpretability of CIL.
Treaties would be a peculiar place to look for evidence that CIL can be in-
terpreted. However, the Statutes of two international courts, and their prepa-
ratory work, do exactly that. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)36 in Article 21, relating to applicable law, provides that the ICC 
“may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions”37 
and that the “application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must 
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights”.38
Similarly, in the preparatory work of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), the Advisory Committee of Jurists when discuss-
ing Article 36 of the PCIJ Statute had to choose between different versions of 
the Article. Two are the most apposite for the present analysis. The first one, 
based on a draft prepared by Lord Phillimore,39 provided for the jurisdiction 
of the PCIJ in all legal disputes concerning “. . . a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law.”40 The second one was an amendment 
proposed by Ricci-Busatti that instead of the terms “question of international 
35   On the acceptance of the interpretability of CIL, and the need to conduct research on 
the topic of the rules that govern it see: Kolb, supra note 15, pp. 219 et seq.; Denis Alland, 
“L interprétation du droit international public” 362 RdC (2014) pp. 82–88; Albert 
Bleckmann, “Zur Feststellung und Auslegung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht”, 37 ZaöRV 
(1977), pp. 504–529; Orakhelashvili, supra note 34, Chapter 15; Merkouris, supra note 15, 
Chapter 4.
36   1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3 (hereinafter ICC 
Statute).
37   Ibid., Article 21(2) (emphasis added).
38   Ibid., Article 21(3) (emphasis added).
39   Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès Verbaux of the Meetings of the Advisory Committee 
of Jurists: 16 June–24 July 1920 with Annexes (1920), p. 252 (hereinafter Procès Verbaux).
40   1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 6 LNTS 379.
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law” used the terms “. . . b. the interpretation or application of a general rule 
of international law”.41 In the end, the first version found its way in the final 
text of the PCIJ Statute and was later reproduced in the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) Statute. However, that is not the result of a rejection of the inter-
pretability of CIL. On the contrary, the discussion between the members of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists reveals that prominent members considered 
this to be a much better wording than “any question of international law” that 
did not suffer from the pitfalls of the latter.42 However, the “any question of 
international law” was the wording eventually adopted, but this was done not 
on the merits of the wording itself, but for the purpose of ensuring continuity 
and consistency with previous treaties that had used the same wording.43 In 
more detail:
[c]onsideration must be taken also of the important part this expression 
[i.e. ‘any question of international law’] played in the Conferences of 1899 
and 1907; as well as of legal conscience and world opinion which would 
be astonished not to find this term in the Committee’s plan . . . Definite 
previous documents must be followed as much as possible, and it must 
not be forgotten that the expression used in the project is contained in 
Article 13 of the Covenant.44
4.2 Case-Law Evidence
Similarly with treaties, in international jurisprudence the evidence of interpre-
tation of CIL is hidden in plain sight. So much so in fact that clear statements 
to that effect can be found in landmark cases, with which every first-year 
student of international law is familiar. The two most notable examples 
are the Nicaragua case and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. In the former, 
the Court was of the view that “[r]ules which are identical in treaty law and in 
customary international law are also distinguishable by reference to the meth-
ods of interpretation and application”,45 thus clearly accepting the fact that 
41   Procès Verbaux, supra note 40, p. 275 (emphasis added).
42   Ibid., pp. 264–265 and 283–284.
43   Ibid. The treaties that had used similar wording were: 1919 Covenant of the League 
of Nations, 1 LNTS 7, Article 13; 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, 187 CTS 410, Article 16; 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, 215 CTS 233, Article 38; 1903 Arbitration Treaty 
between Great Britain and France, XXIII Hertslet Treaties 492, Article 1; 1908 Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain, XXV Hertslet Treaties 1203.
44   Ibid. at 265.
45   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 178.
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there are rules that guide the process of interpretation of CIL, although these 
will be, by virtue of the nature of CIL, different than those of treaties. This was 
stated more explicitly in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, where Judge 
Tanaka opined in the following manner:
Customary law, being vague and containing gaps compared with written 
law, requires precision and completion about its content. This task, in 
its nature being interpretative, would be incumbent upon the Court. The 
method of logical and teleological interpretation can be applied in the case 
of customary law as in the case of written law.46
Although these two quotes, in and of themselves, should be enough to shatter 
any arguments surrounding the impossibility of interpretation of CIL,47 case-
law is peppered with numerous similar examples coming from a variety of 
international courts and tribunals and dealing with entirely different areas 
of international law. Indicatively, I mention Qatar v. Bahrain,48 EC-Biotech,49 
EC – Large Civil Aircraft,50 Peru – Certain Agricultural Products,51 and CCFT v. 
USA (law of treaties),52 Nicaragua and Tadiç (state responsibility),53 Gulf of 
46   North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 12, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, p. 181 
(emphasis added). Similarly see ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, p. 200.
47   See also the analysis infra in Section 5 on the logical and philosophical implications of 
proving a negative statement, i.e. ‘CIL cannot be interpreted’.
48   Qatar v. Bahrain case, supra note 2, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, 
pp. 27–39.
49   European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WTO, Panel Report adopted on 21 November 2006, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R and 
WT/DS293R, paras. 7.68–7.72. (hereinafter EC-Biotech case).
50   European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WTO, Appellate Body Report adopted on 18 May 2011, WT/DS316/AB/R, para. 
845 (hereinafter EC – Large Civil Aircraft).
51   Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WTO, Appellate Body 
Report adopted on 20 July 2015, WT/DS457/AB/R, para. 5.101 (hereinafter Peru – Certain 
Agricultural Products).
52   Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade (CCFT) v. the United States of America, UNCITRAL, 
Award on Jurisdiction of 28 January 2008, paras. 50–51 and 187 (hereinafter CCFT v. USA 
case), available at: <http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0114 
.pdf> (last accessed on 20 January 2016).
53   Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 15 July 1999, Case No. 
IT-94-1-A, para. 116.
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Maine,54 Fisheries55 and Tunisia v. Libya Continental Shelf (law of the sea),56 
the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons (jus ad bellum and jus in bello),57 
Barcelona Traction (diplomatic protection),58 and Alex Genin59 and Mondev 
(investment law).60
Elsewhere, I have offered a brief analysis of possible rules of interpretation 
of CIL using Tanaka’s dictum on logical and teleological interpretation as a 
springboard.61 All the aforementioned examples and analysis should be suf-
ficient to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that CIL can be interpreted and 
that we should research the rules guiding that process. However, for the pur-
poses of the present article, I have opted for going a step further, i.e. to dem-
onstrate that even the rules of interpretation themselves have been the object 
of interpretation on multiple occasions. If even in this extreme and somewhat 
self-referential scenario, we can find evidence of CIL interpretation, then not 
only any objection to the interpretability of CIL can no longer be maintained 
but also it will be shown that the process of interpretation of CIL is so endem-
ic to the application of CIL that it forms an integral part of its existence and 
application, and without which it can neither function properly nor its func-
tion be explained in a properly scientific manner.
5 Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation
Having established that interpretation of CIL is not only theoretical plausible, 
but essential in the ‘life-cycle’ of CIL, what will now be examined is whether 
54   Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, para. 111.
55   Fisheries (the United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Hsu Mo, pp. 154–155.
56   Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1982, paras. 38 
and 70 (emphasis added).
57   Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, pp. 299–300; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen, p. 398; ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, paras. 24 and 32.
58   Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Second Phase) (Belgium v. Spain), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, para. 54.
59   Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Ltd., Inc. and A.S. Baltoil Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID, 
Award of 25 June 2001, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, para. 367.
60   Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID, Award of 11 October 2002, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, para. 113.
61   Merkouris, supra note 15, Chapter 4.
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even the customary rules of interpretation themselves can be the object of in-
terpretation. It has to be noted that this exercise is not necessary in order to 
prove the interpretability of CIL, and this is perhaps the Sisyphean nature of 
the task of those rejecting the interpretability of CIL;62 the near impossibility 
of proving a negative. This issue has been discussed extensively in linguistics, 
philosophy and mathematics. By arguing that ‘CIL cannot be interpreted’, one 
has to prove that for each and every situation CIL cannot and has not been 
interpreted. On the other hand, those, the present author included, who argue 
that ‘CIL can be interpreted’ have only to find one (only one) example of such 
an interpretation in order to disprove the original statement. The classical 
example is the so-called ‘black swan’ example. The statement ‘all swans are 
white’ is based on the premise, ‘no swan can have any other colour other 
than white’. Every white swan discovered reinforces that statement, but can-
not prove it. On the other hand, the discovery of just one black swan63 can 
completely disprove the first statement. Consequently, the probative value of 
each instance is widely different. In the present case, I have already provided 
numerous examples of interpretation of CIL, of ‘black swans’. However, and in 
order to demonstrate how wide-spread and integral to the function of CIL is its 
interpretation, I will in this Section prove that not only some customary rules 
can be interpreted, but even the rules of interpretation themselves. If even in 
this extreme case, where we have what amounts to a self-referential set, we 
can prove that the customary rules of interpretation can be the object of in-
terpretation, then by application of the logical principle a majore ad minus, it 
is evident that interpretation of CIL is relevant for each and every rule of CIL.
5.1  Interpretation of Article 31(3)(a) &(b) VCLT as Customary Law
In our inquiry into examples of interpretation of the customary rules of inter-
pretation, the work of the ILC proves to be extremely useful. In 2008 the ILC 
62   See supra note 26.
63   This refers to the well-known example of falsifiability of universal generalizations. For 
instance, the statement, “all swans are white” can be disproven by the observation of a 
single black swan (swans of such colour can be found in New Zealand and Australia). In 
the same fashion, the statement “no CIL rule can be interpreted” can be disproven even by 
a single instance where a CIL has been interpreted (the process, through which from an 
observation of CIL rules being interpreted to come to the conclusion that the statement 
“no CIL rule can be interpreted” is false, is known as modus tollens). In more detail on the 
problem of induction and falsifiability see: Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(London: Routledge, 2002).
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decided to include the topic ‘Treaties over Time’ in its programme of work.64 
So far three reports have bene produced by the Special Rapporteur Georg 
Nolte, all of which offer valuable examples of instances of interpretation of 
Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT and their customary law counterparts.65 Going 
through these reports, one will come across many instances where there is very 
limited State practice and opinio juris on a particular issue. Despite this there 
are some limited cases that have provided answers, sometimes contradictory 
ones.66 Clearly in these situations, it cannot be argued that there the material 
and psychological element of custom is met. Consequently, all these instances 
are nothing more than different interpretations of the same customary rule. 
Such interpretations may at a future time reach the required level of density of 
practice and opinio juris, but for the time being since that is not the case, they 
cannot be considered as the established content of an existing customary rule, 
but rather an interpretation of the general customary rule, i.e. an interpreta-
tion of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) CIL.
The aim in this Section is not to provide based on these reports an extensive 
and exhaustive list of all such cases where interpretation of the customary law 
equivalents of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT67 occurred, but rather to highlight 
some of the most interesting examples that will more than suffice to prove that 
the CIL rules of interpretation can and have been interpreted in international 
case-law.
One such example is whether decisions of the Conference of the Parties or 
Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP decisions) not adopted in the presence of all 
the parties, can be assumed to fall under Article 31(3)(a) despite the lack of an 
explicit expression of consent by the missing parties. Two points need to be 
underlined in this scenario. Firstly, there exists no international case, let alone 
sufficient practice and opinio juris, addressing this specific point. Second, a 
similar issue has been raised quite a few times with respect to Article 32 and 
it was also the object of a similar process of interpretation.68 But coming back 
64   Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/63/10), para. 353.
65   The text of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT goes as follows: “There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation”.
66   See in more detail, case-law analysed in: Nolte, “First Report”, supra note 21 and Nolte, 
“Second Report”, supra note 21.
67   For reasons of convenience, these will be referred to as Article 31(3)(a) and (b) CIL.
68   See infra, Section 5.3.
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to the point at hand, the ILC concluded that in the case of COP/MOP decision 
that would be an Article 31(3)(a) subsequent agreement if all the parties had 
adopted it, this would also be the case even if one or more parties did not par-
ticipate in the Conference, as long as certain conditions were met.
It would be difficult to assume that a party to a treaty has agreed, by its 
consent to be bound by the treaty, to accept decisions which are sub-
sequently taken in its absence by other States parties within the frame-
work of the Conference of States Parties concerned. It should therefore 
be possible for non-participating States to subsequently express their 
disagreement with a decision that was taken within the framework of a 
Conference of States Parties. On the other hand, the principle of good faith 
and the duty to cooperate within the treaty framework speak in favour of a 
duty of non-participating States to articulate their possible disagreement 
as soon as possible under the circumstances; otherwise their agreement 
in the form of silence (acquiescence) would have to be assumed.69
The whole structure of this paragraph clearly demonstrates that this is an 
example of logical, teleological and systemic interpretation. All the infer-
ences that are made regarding whether the COP/MOP decisions fall under 
Article 31(3)(a) (both VCLT and CIL), are not based on State practice and opinio 
juris since none exists, but rather on logical assumptions based on the object 
and purpose of the rule, as well as by reference to other rules/principles of 
international law such as the principle of good faith and the duty to cooper-
ate (systemic interpretation). So, clearly this is an example of interpretation of 
Article 31(3)(a) CIL.
Another example comes from a NAFTA Panel in the Cross-Border Trucking 
Services, where it rejected the possibility of interpretative recourse to domestic 
law. In a Section discussing the rules of interpretation the Panel, does a volte 
face and refers to Article 27 VCLT. In detail:
in light of the fact that both Parties have made references to their national 
legislation on land transportation, the Panel deems it appropriate to refer 
to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention, which states that ‘a party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty.’ This provision directs the Panel not to examine national 
laws but the applicable international law. Thus, neither the internal 
law of the United States nor the Mexican law should be utilized for the 
69   Nolte, “Second Report”, supra note 21, para. 109 (emphasis added).
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interpretation of NAFTA. To do so would be to apply an inappropriate 
legal framework.70
This reference to Article 27 of the VCLT although seemingly untethered to the 
overall interpretative discussion, is in actuality nothing more than another ex-
ample of systemic interpretation of Article 31(3)(b) CIL. While discussing the 
customary rules of interpretation, and in order to conclude that domestic law 
is not an interpretative element to be taken into account, it refers to a relevant 
rule of international law, the VCLT and in particular Article 27. Despite the fact 
that this interpretation of Article 31 CIL, in the author’s opinion, is erroneous, 
a feeling shared by other courts and tribunals and the ILC,71 this does not de-
tract from the fact that it is another example of interpretation of CIL rules of 
interpretation.72
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, in US – Clove 
Cigarettes, also resorted to the terms used in the VCLT, in order to interpret 
Article 31(3)(a) CIL.73 In determining whether paragraph 5.2 of the Doha 
Ministerial Decision could be considered as a “subsequent agreement” it re-
ferred to the terms, or lack thereof, used in Article 31(3)(a) VCLT and from that 
deduced that the term ‘agreement’ established a requirement more of sub-
stance rather than form (both logical and systemic interpretation). At no point 
did the judicial reasoning touch upon the issue of whether this solution was 
evidenced by State practice and opinio juris.
We note that the text of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention does 
not establish a requirement as to the form which a ‘subsequent agree-
ment between the parties’ should take. We consider, therefore, that the 
term ‘agreement’ in Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention refers, 
fundamentally, to substance rather than to form. Thus, in our view, 
paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision can be character-
ized as a ‘subsequent agreement’ . . . provided that it clearly expresses 
70   In the matter of Cross-Border Trucking (Mexico vs. United States of America), NAFTA, 
Final Report of the Panel of 6 February 2001, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, 
para. 224.
71   Nolte, “First Report”, supra note 21, paras. 113–115 and cases cited therein.
72   Not to mention that some of the cases where the international courts resorted to domes-
tic law as a form of “subsequent practice” or “supplementary means” did so, originally, also 
by virtue of an interpretative process.
73   Note that the WTO Panels and Appellate Body according to the DSU are to apply the cus-
tomary rules of interpretation, not the VCLT as such.
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a common understanding, and an acceptance of that understanding 
among Members . . .74
Of course, the Reports on “Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in 
relation to interpretation of treaties” are rife with numerous other examples of 
interpretation Article 31(3)(a) and (b) CIL,75 but the ones mentioned should 
more than suffice to illustrate that Article 31(3)(a) and (b) CIL has been and 
continues to be the object of interpretation.
5.2 Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as Customary Law
The principle of systemic integration, enshrined in Articles 31(3)(c) VCLT, pro-
vides that, together with the context, account shall be taken of “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. Each 
and every element of this provision76 raises significant interpretative issues.77 
However, for the purposes of this article the most revealing one is what is the 
proper interpretation of the term ‘parties’? Should it be understood as ‘parties 
to the treaty’ or ‘parties to the dispute’? Depending on the approach taken this 
will have long-term knock-on effects as to the rules that can be taken into ac-
count for interpretative purposes under Article 31(3)(c). If one accepts the in-
terpretation of ‘any party to the treaty’, this means that all parties to the treaty 
being interpreted must be parties to the treaty being invoked under Article 
31(3)(c). This, of course, especially in the case of multilateral treaties would 
significantly restrict the pool of treaties, to which an international judge could 
resort to for interpretative inspiration. On the other hand, if ‘parties to the dis-
pute’ is the interpretation given to Article 31(3)(c) then the common parties 
between the treaties need be only the two parties to the dispute. Consequently, 
74   United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO, 
Appellate Body Report adopted on 4 April 2012, WT/DS406/AB/R, para. 267.
75   Indicatively, whether in cases of “serial bilateralism” (Eyal Benvenisti and George 
W. Downs, “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law”, 60 Stanford Law Review (2007), pp. 610–661), the bilateral treaties 
should be considered as either “subsequent practice” or “supplementary means” (Nolte, 
“First Report”, supra note 21, paras. 81–83); or that the question whether a particular form 
of practice can be considered as State practice, will be determined by reference to the 
customary rules of attribution (systemic interpretation) (Nolte, “First Report”, supra note 
21, paras. 120–124).
76   Alongside with some elements that were eventually left on the cutting floor of the Vienna 
Conference.
77   For a detailed analysis, see Merkouris, supra note 15.
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the range of treaties that would fall within the ambit of Article 31(3)(c) would 
be much greater.
One of the most-cited cases regarding Articles 31(3)(c) is the EC-Biotech. 
In that case, the WTO Panel had to find whether treaties could be taken into 
account under Article 31(3)(c). In doing so, it concluded that:
This understanding of the term “the parties” leads logically to the view 
that the rules of international law to be taken into account in interpreting 
the WTO agreements at issue in this dispute are those which are appli-
cable in the relations between the WTO Members . . . Taking account of 
the fact that Article 31(3)(c) mandates consideration of other applicable 
rules of international law, and that such consideration may prompt a 
treaty interpreter to adopt one interpretation rather than another, we 
think it makes sense to interpret Article 31(3)(c) as requiring consider-
ation of those rules of international law which are applicable in the rela-
tions between all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted.78
This led many to conclude that the Panel in EC-Biotech had opted for the 
‘parties to the treaty’ interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) (restrictive interpre-
tation). However, that is not accurate at all. Although indeed the Panel was 
inclined to consider that interpretation as the more appropriate one in the 
case at hand, the Panel made it abundantly clear that:
Before applying our interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) to the present case, 
it is important to note that the present case is not one in which relevant 
rules of international law are applicable in the relations between all par-
ties to the dispute, but not between all WTO Members, and in which all 
parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO agreement should 
be interpreted in the light of these other rules of international law. 
Therefore, we need not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a 
situation we would be entitled to take the relevant other rules of interna-
tional law into account.79
Consequently, the only firm position it took was that Article 31(3)(c) could not 
be interpreted as ‘any one of the parties to the dispute’. However, what is sig-
nificant is how the Panel arrived at this conclusion. First of all, I would like 
to draw the readers’ attention to the fact that in the span of five paragraphs 
(7.68–7.72) the Panel refers to interpretation or understanding of the terms of 
78   EC-Biotech, supra note 50, paras. 7.69–7.70.
79   Ibid., para. 7.72.
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Articles 31(3)(c) no less than 13 times. Consequently, the Panel is well aware 
that it is engaged in an interpretative process.
In addition to this, the Panel is not interpreting Article 31(3)(c) VCLT but 
its equivalent in CIL.80 Pursuant to Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) the WTO Panels and Appellate Body interpret the WTO 
agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.” Consequently, they cannot and do not apply the VCLT but 
CIL. When they are talking about the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c), they are 
not interpreting the VCLT provision but CIL. Of course, one could argue that 
they are interpreting the VCLT provision81 and then transposing that interpre-
tation to CIL. But such an argument is still far removed from the classical ap-
proach of identifying the existence of a customary rule through State practice 
and opinio juris. The only manner in which such a process can be explained 
without rending asunder the theoretical fabric of the sources of international 
law, is by accepting that CIL is being interpreted and that the VCLT is referred 
to as a document that can be taken into account for interpretative purposes. 
But such a description leads us inescapably to the conclusion that the VCLT is 
being resorted to because it is a ‘relevant rule’ for the purposes of interpreta-
tion of the Article 31(3)(c) CIL. Consequently, codification (or partly codifi-
cation) treaties and in this case the rules of interpretation in the VCLT, are 
resorted to in the context of the principle of systemic integration. The Panel in 
EC-Biotech interpreted Article 31(3)(c) CIL by reference to the text and context 
of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, as a ‘relevant rule’.
But this is not the end of the line of reasoning and, in fact, this final step 
of legal analysis demonstrates the dangers and creeping inconsistencies that 
emerge as a direct result of a lack of discussion on the interpretability of CIL 
and the rules regulating that process. As mentioned above, the Panel felt that 
the restrictive interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) was the one indicated by the 
text and context of the VCLT. However, as demonstrated above, such reference 
to the VCLT was interpretatively permitted only by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) 
CIL. But not all the parties to the dispute were parties to the VCLT. Neither the 
European Communities nor the USA are parties to it. Consequently, the Panel 
referred by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) CIL to a ‘relevant rule applicable in the 
relations between some of the parties to the dispute’ in order to conclude that 
Article 31(3)(c) CIL is to be read as ‘relevant rules applicable in the relations 
between all the parties to the treaty’. In essence, the Panel disproved what 
it had axiomatically relied on in order to reach an interpretative conclusion. 
80   For reasons of convenience, this will be referred to as Article 31(3)(c) CIL.
81   Although this would per se be problematic as the VCLT and its interpretation does not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies.
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It concluded –x based on a line of reasoning that was premised on the assumption 
that the conclusion cannot be –x. Or in set theory terms, in order for -x ∈ 31(3)
(c), -x ∉ 31(3)(c). This is a clear argumentum ad absurdum, as an interpretation 
of Article 31(3)(c) and its opposite cannot be valid at the same time.
Later WTO cases steered clear of this controversy, by focusing more on the 
interpretation of the term ‘relevant’.82 In particular, in EC – Large Civil Aircraft 
and Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, the 
WTO Appellate Body opined that
. . . we recognize that a proper interpretation of the term ‘the parties’ must 
also take account of the fact that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
is considered an expression of the ‘principle of systemic integration’.83
It then interpreted Article 31(3)(c) by reference to the VCLT, to principles of good 
faith, pacta sunt servanda and the principle of effectiveness84 (all examples 
of systemic interpretation), but also to the “purpose of treaty interpretation”85 
(which is an example of teleological interpretation). Consequently, the WTO 
jurisprudence on Article (3)(c) CIL, seems to confirm the preliminary findings 
of Judge Tanaka in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
5.3 Interpretation of Article 32 VCLT as Customary Law
With respect to the interpretation of the customary rule on recourse to supple-
mentary means of interpretation, three areas have been selected that in the 
author’s view best highlight the fact that Article 32 CIL has also been subjected 
to the process of interpretation.86
The first area concerns the scope ratione materiae of the rule, more spe-
cifically what is to be considered as supplementary means. In CCFT v. USA the 
Tribunal devotes an entire Section of its reasoning to qualifying reference to 
other judicial decisions as ‘supplementary means’. Essentially, the Tribunal 
82   EC – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 51, para. 845; Peru – Certain Agricultural Products, 
supra note 52, para. 5.101.
83   EC – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 51, para. 845 (emphasis added).
84   Ibid.
85   Ibid.
86   The text of Article 32 VCLT goes as follows: “Recourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circum-
stances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application 
of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable”.
 151
International Community Law Review 19 (2�17) 126–155
Interpreting The Customary Rules On Interpretation
embarks on an interpretative process through which it attempts to determine 
that judicial decisions are included in the more ‘generic term’ of ‘supplemen-
tary means’. It does this by referring to the terms used in two treaties; Article 32 
VCLT and Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.87 Interesting is the fact, which un-
fortunately we have seen repeated on multiple occasions already, that despite 
CIL being the applicable law since USA has not ratified the VCLT, the Tribunal 
immediately goes to that treaty and starts its interpretative process by breaking 
down the meaning of the words used in Article 32. This recourse to ‘codification 
treaties’ is nothing more than an example of logical/systemic interpretation of 
CIL.88 But to make matters even more interesting the Tribunal resorts to sys-
temic interpretation not once but twice. It considers that Article 38(1)(d) of the 
ICJ Statute is also a ‘relevant rule’ of international law that can be useful in the 
interpretation of what can be considered as supplementary means. According 
to the Tribunal “Article 38[(1)(d)] of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice provides that judicial decisions are applicable for the interpretation of 
public international law as ‘subsidiary means’. Therefore, they must be under-
stood to be also supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 
VCLT”.89 Of course, one can criticize the leaps in logic that the Tribunal takes, 
when equating ‘supplementary’ with ‘subsidiary’,90 however, the fact remains 
that the Tribunal engaged in a process of systemic interpretation of Article 32 
CIL, where it took account not one but two ‘relevant rules of international law’, 
Article 32 VCLT and Article 38 ICJ Statute.
A similar systemic interpretation was conducted by a WTO Panel in EC – 
Chicken Classification,91 but there the Panel, referring again to the VCLT, 
concluded that judicial decisions92 could be considered not as ‘other supple-
mentary means’ but specifically as ‘circumstances of conclusion’.93 Not only 
that but on the basis of the wording and the telos of Article 32 VCLT it also 
87   CCFT v. USA case, supra note 53, paras. 50–51 (emphasis in original).
88   See Merkouris, supra note 15, Chapter 4.
89   CCFT v. USA case, supra note 53, para. 187.
90   Since the former was selected to indicate a degree of sub-ordinance of this source com-
pared to the formal sources of international law, whereas the latter was selected to under-
score that interpretation was a holistic exercise.
91   European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WTO, 
Panel Report adopted on 30 May 2005, WT/DS269/R and WT/DS286/R (hereinafter EC – 
Chicken Classification (PR)).
92   Specifically two judicial decisions: C-175/82, Hans Dinter GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Köln-Deutz, 
CJEU, Judgment of 17 March 1983; C-33/92, Gausepohl-Fleisch GmbH v. Oberfinanzdirektion 
Hamburg, CJEU, Judgment of 27 May 1993.
93   EC – Chicken Classification (PR), supra note 92, para. 7.391 and footnote 681.
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concluded that for determining whether a judicial decision falls within the 
ambit of ‘circumstances of conclusion’, two criteria exist: i) relevance and ii) 
temporal proximity.94 Consequently, and although the WTO Panel came to 
a different qualification of judicial decisions, its conclusion was arrived at 
through an interpretative process mostly systemic (by reference to the VCLT) 
but also partly teleological (by reference to the object and purpose of the rule).
In another set of cases, the scope ratione materiae of Article 32 CIL once 
again became the object of interpretation, but this time the issue in question 
was whether preparatory work could be invoked against or by States that were 
not amongst the original signatories of a treaty and had not participated in the 
negotiations of the treaty in question. Although the issue seems to have been 
resolved nowadays in the affirmative, provided that the conditions of acces-
sibility and publication are satisfied, and arguably attained the level of cus-
tomary law, originally this was not such a clear issue. The international courts 
and tribunals that dealt with this problem came to diverging conclusions, with 
some finding against the invocation of preparatory work against ‘third States’,95 
while others in favour of it.96 What is critical for the present analysis is that 
irrespective of the final conclusion, the process through which the courts and 
tribunals arrived at it was not an inductive one, focused on establishing State 
practice and opinio juris, but rather a deductive/interpretative one, focusing on 
the object and purpose of the rule (teleological interpretation), as well as the 
existence of other relevant rules of international law with which the recourse 
to preparatory work should not conflict, such as the principles of res inter alios 
acta and the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (i.e. a systemic interpretation).
A final set of cases regarding the interpretation of the customary rule of 
recourse to preparatory work involves questions of whether preparatory work 
94   Ibid., paras. 7.344 and 7.390–7.392.
95   Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (the United 
Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany and Sweden v. Poland), Order of 20 
August 1929, PCIJ Series A No. 23, p. 42; Young Loan Arbitration (the United Kingdom, United 
States of America, France, Belgium and Switzerland v. Federal Republic of Germany), Award 
of 16 May 1980, 59 ILR (1980), pp. 544–547.
96   Always under the condition of publication and/or accessibility: Aerial Incident of 27 July 
1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1959, pp. 140 et seq.; ibid., Joint Dissenting 
Opinion by Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender, pp. 179–
180; Italy v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 14 November 1959, 29 ILR (1966), pp. 
460–470; Government of the Kingdom of Greece (in behalf of Apostolidis) v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, Decision of 11 May 1960, 34 ILR (1967), pp. 242–245; United States – Safeguard 
Measures on Import of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 
WTO, Panel Report adopted on 16 May 2001, WT/DS177/R and WT/DS178/R, paras. 7.110 
et seq.
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can be used to correct/rectify the meaning of the text. Once again, there is very 
limited State practice and opinio juris on the matter, so no argument could be 
raised that any solution to this question has already attained customary law 
status. International judicial practice has equally been divided on the matter, 
with the solutions given ranging from outright rejection of a ‘corrective func-
tion’ to interpretation,97 to acceptance of the theoretical plausibility of such 
a function being part of Article 32 CIL,98 up to actually resorting to prepara-
tory work in order to correct the meaning of the text.99 However, once again, 
and irrespective of the wide range of interpretations offered, all of them re-
volve around the exact same attractors as in all the cases mentioned in this 
Section; the logic and teleology of Article 32 CIL. Amongst these cases, Qatar 
v. Bahrain is perhaps the most illustrative example as there Judge Schwebel in 
his Dissenting Opinion analysed in extenso his interpretation of Article 32 CIL.100 
First, he expresses the view that contrary to what the Court said, he was of 
the view that the meaning of the Arabic expression ‘al-tarafan’, which was the 
crux of the interpretative dispute, was not clear.101 However, even if one took 
97   Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, Advisory 
Opinion, PCIJ Series B No. 14, p. 31. (hereinafter Jurisdiction of the Danube Commission 
Advisory Opinion).
98   Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ Series B No. 11, pp. 6 et seq.; S.S. Lotus 
(France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Series A No. 10, p. 17; Payment of Various Serbian Loans 
Issued in France (France v. Serbia), Judgment, PCIJ Series A No. 20, p. 30; Payment in Gold 
of the Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France (France v. Brazil), Judgment, PCIJ Series 
A. No. 21, pp. 114–115; Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory (Preliminary 
Objection) (the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan v. Lithuania), Judgment, PCIJ Series 
A/B No. 47, pp. 249–253; North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. United States of 
America), PCA, Award of 7 September 1910, XI RIAA (1961), p. 186; Roumanian Minister of 
War v. The Turkish Government (Romania v. Turkey), Award of 26 April 1928, VII Tribunaux 
Arbitraux Mixtes (1928), p. 996; Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v. United States of America, 
Award of 22 January 1926, VI RIAA (1955), p. 184. Generally, see: Hersch Lauterpacht, “Les 
travaux préparatoires et l’ intérpretation des traités”, 48/II RdC (1934), p. 789.
99   Qatar v. Bahrain case, supra note 2, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, 
pp. 27–39; Boundaries in the Island of Timor (Netherlands v. Portugal), PCA, Award of 
25 June 1914, XI RIAA (1961), p. 502; Polyxene Plessa v. the Turkish Government (Greece v. 
Turkey), Award of 9 February 1928, VIII Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (1929), pp. 224 et seq.; 
Eastern Bank Ltd. v. the Turkish Government (the United Kingdom v. Turkey), Award of 28 
December 1927, VIII Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (1929), p. 188; Antippa v. Germany (Greece 
v. Germany), Award of 3 November 1926, VII Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes (1928).
100   Qatar v. Bahrain case, supra note 2, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, 
pp. 27–39.
101   The issue was whether this term should be interpreted as ‘either of the parties’ or ‘both 
parties jointly’.
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the Court’s view that it was clear, he was of the opinion that preparatory work 
proved that the opposite interpretation was the correct one. Consequently, the 
issue arose of preparatory work leading to a different interpretation that that 
of the so-called ‘ordinary meaning’.
Schwebel rightly points out that the solution to this conflict is not to be 
found in customary law.102 Consequently, and in order to provide an answer 
he takes the following steps. He refers to the VCLT and its preparatory work 
as a ‘relevant rule of international law’ (systemic interpretation)103 and to the 
primary object and purpose of treaty interpretation which is “the revealing of 
the intention of the parties” (teleological interpretation).104 This leads him to 
the conclusion that preparatory work can have, apart from a confirmatory and 
determinative function, a corrective one as well. He reinforces this conclusion 
by another instance of systemic interpretation. He suggests that not allowing 
preparatory work to correct the meaning of the text would be contrary to an-
other ‘relevant rule of international law’, i.e. the principle of good faith.105
6 Conclusion
In this article the question put forward was whether the customary rules of 
interpretation could also be the object of interpretation. As a first step in that 
direction, some common misconceptions had to be dispelled. It was demon-
strated that interpretation of CIL was a reflection of the continued manifesta-
tion of CIL rules as rules of international law. Whereas the inductive process 
of establishing the existence of sufficient State practice and opinio juris was 
required in order for determining the existence of a CIL rule, its application 
in a variety of instances rested squarely upon the deductive process of in-
terpretation. Consequently, the inductive and deductive processes were not 
merely methodological tools to be used at will and interchangeably but were 
reflections of the different stages in the ‘life-cycle’ of a CIL rule. The induc-
tive process was apposite to the stage of determining the existence of CIL rule. 
The deductive process of interpretation, on the other hand, was apposite to 
102   Qatar v. Bahrain case, supra note 2, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, 
pp. 31–32.
103   Ibid., pp. 29–31.
104   Ibid., p. 27.
105   Ibid., p. 39. One could also add here that it would also rob the customary rule enshrined 
in Article 32 VCLT of its effectiveness and in that sense would also be contrary to the prin-
ciple ut res magis valeat quam pereat (principle of effectiveness).
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determining the content of the rule after it had been established that it had 
come into existence. Another common misconception that had to be resolved 
was that interpretation of State practice is not the same as ‘interpretation of 
CIL’. In fact, it not even ‘interpretation’ in the proper, legal sense of the word. 
Rather it is evaluation.
Having set the definitional framework for the present article, the analysis 
shifted to a brief demonstration that CIL can and has been interpreted with 
respect to a variety of CIL rules. Evidence was provided both with respect to 
treaties and to international case-law. The most revealing of these, was Judge 
Tanaka’s identification of some of the rules of interpretation of CIL, i.e. the 
logical (or systemic) teleological interpretation. Armed with this, the analyti-
cal lens was turned to examining whether these rules of interpretation of CIL 
could apply even in the extreme and somewhat self-referential scenario of in-
terpretation of the customary rules of interpretation. Even though from a dis-
cursive point of view, even one example would suffice to disprove the negation 
of the interpretability of both the customary rules of interpretation and, more 
generally, of CIL as such, it was shown that the interpretation of the customary 
rules of interpretation is not only a reality but even more so a relatively com-
mon occurrence. A far from exhaustive analysis of the existing jurisprudence 
revealed a cornucopia of cases where Articles 31 and 32 CIL had been interpret-
ed and in a manner reaffirming Tanaka’s dictum. Although this proof signalled 
the end of the purpose of this article, it can only be hoped that the uncovering 
of such a vast and mostly unchartered area in the field of both interpretation 
and CIL will lead to more detailed examinations and discussion on the topic of 
interpretation of CIL.
